现金股利政策:法律保护的结果还是法律保护的替代——来自我国上市公司的证据

与LLSV横向研究不同,本文从纵向检验了现金股利法律保护替代模型与结果模型在我国的适用性。首先,纵向分阶段的回归分析和差异检验表明:两模型在我国的适用性呈现出阶段性特征,在法律保护较弱的阶段,法律保护替代模型具有一定的适用性,随着法律保护程度的提高,法律保护结果模型对我国上市公司的现金股利政策更有解释力。其次,检验了我国交叉上市公司与无交叉上市公司现金股利支付率的差异,进一步证明了现金股利法律保护结果模型的适用性。同时,我们也发现一个有趣的问题,现金股利支付率与每股收益显著负相关,与增长机会不具有显著负相关性,说明公司的现金股利政策不是根据盈利状况和增长机会做出的。

The Dividend Policy: Outcome or Substitute of Legal Protection——Evidences from Listed Companies in China

This paper tests the application of dividends as a substitute and an outcome for legal protection of shareholders interests in our listed firms by vertical and horizontal studies. First, the two models have emerged in different applications and in different stages. In the phase of the weaker legal protection, the dividend policy is a substitute for legal protection of shareholders interests. But with the increased legal protection, the outcome of legal protection of shareholders interests has better applicability. Secondly, by testing the cash dividends payout differences of the horizontal crossing-listed firms, the outcome of legal protection of shareholders is more appropriate. We find that there is a significant negative relation between the cash dividends payout and per share earning, but insignificant negative relation with growth opportunities.