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财务契约理论文献综述
引用本文:袁克利.财务契约理论文献综述[J].财会通讯,2007(5).
作者姓名:袁克利
作者单位:东北财经大学内部控制与风险管理研究中心 辽宁大连
摘    要:本文回顾了财务契约理论的演变过程,重点分析了财务约束、重新协商、控制权配置和索取权多样化等主要模型。认为保护投资者权益的根本机制是财务约束,即投资者要求企业给以足够的投资回报,否则就夺取企业的控制权从而使当前的控制人失去控制权利益。债务在公司治理中的作用一是迫使管理者支出自由现金,减少在职消费和低效投资;二是作为一种控制权转移机制,在股东和债权人之间转移企业的控制权,以实现最高经济效率。

关 键 词:财务契约  财务约束  重新协商  控制权配置  索取权多样化

A Review of Financial Contract Theory
Yuan Keli.A Review of Financial Contract Theory[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2007(5).
Authors:Yuan Keli
Abstract:The article reviews the evolution of financial contract theories, paying great attention on the four main groups of models: financial constraint models,renegotiation models,control rights allocation models and claim diversity models. The main conclusion of the article is that the fundamental mechanism of investor protection is financial constraints,that is,the investors claim enough return on their investment,and if this claim is not complied by the one who is in control of the firm, they will lose the control right and related benefits. Debts play an important role in corporate governance. Firstly,the debts make it demanded that the manager pays out free cash flow of the firm,which reduces the funds the managers may use in their own consumption or invest in invaluable investments. Secondly,debts act as a mechanism of control right shift,it allocates the control right of the firm between shareholders and debtors to achieve the greatest economic efficiency.
Keywords:Financial Contracts Financial Constraints Rearrange Allocation of Control Right Claim diversity
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