纵向结构与投入品竞价合谋的悖论分析--日资配件企业“垄断协议”案的若干思考

2013年以来，跨国公司主导的价格合谋和价格歧视受到了中国反垄断机构的调查和处罚。文章以汽车配件行业中“日资企业”的价格垄断案为线索，构建了一个纵向股权关联下投入品价格合谋和集团内转移定价的理论模型，通过静态比较分析发现：关联企业之间的价格投标合谋并不符合“利润最大化”的目标，而是跨国公司作为实际控制人在上下游股权比例和盈利能力不对等的条件下，将下游整车合资企业的利润转移到上游配件企业的一种手段。文章从股权比例和企业运营模式的层面论证了利润转移假说的合意性，并结合主要细分市场的结构和利润关系，对“结构－合谋”原理所面临的现实矛盾进行了深入分析。文章的主要政策建议是：中国汽车产业的反垄断立法要实现从行为惩罚到规则干预的转化，要适当增加产业组织分析的证据以提高执法的科学水准，需要更多地使用合理推定原则以避免对企业理性行为的不当干预。

Vertical Structure and Paradox Analysis of Input Goods Bidding Collusion:Some Reflections on“Monopoly Agreement” Case of Japanese Auto Parts Enterprises

Price collusion and price discrimination dominated by multinational enter‐prises have been investigated and punished by China’ s antitrust authorities since 2013 . Based on Japanese auto parts companies’ price bidding collusion case ,this paper models the behavior of inputs price collusion and transfer pricing inside these enterprise groups un‐der vertical equity-related structure .Comparative static analysis shows that price bidding collusion between affiliated enterprises does not align with the goal of “profit maximiza‐tion” .Actually ,the collusion just acts as a tool for multinational enterprises as real con‐trollers to transfer profits from dow nstream vehicle joint ventures to their upstream parts companies in the background of asymmetric equity ratio and profitability between down‐stream and upstream firms .This paper confirms the desirability of profit transfer hypothe‐sis from the perspectives of equity ratio and enterprise operation modes ,and also deep ana‐lyzes the real contradictions faced by structure-conspiracy rules by the combination of the relationship between market structure and profits in main market segments .It provides the main policy recommendations that antitrust legislation in Chinese automobile industry should involve from “behavior punishment” to “regulation intervention” ,more evidence supported by industrial organization analysis should increase appropriately to improve the scientific level of law enforcement ,and the principle of reasonable presumption should be more used to avoid inadequate intervention on enterprise behavior .