高管同酬、激励效率与公司绩效

我国部分上市公司的董事长和总经理领取的年薪完全相同。这种高管同酬的确定依据是什么？高管同酬是否具有激励效率？高管同酬又会对公司绩效产生什么影响？文章利用2007－2012年 A 股上市公司数据，对高管同酬及其经济后果进行了实证分析。研究发现，部分上市公司出现高管同酬，主要是因为高管薪酬由公司政治因素或内部薪酬比较所决定，而并非遵循最优契约观所寓示的“效率逻辑”；与高管异酬的公司相比，高管同酬公司的董事长薪酬激励缺乏效率；高管同酬对公司未来财务绩效产生了显著的负面影响。这表明在中国情境下，高管薪酬契约的设计和实施需要关注公司权力博弈或内部薪酬比较等非经济性因素的影响。

Top Management Pay Equality,Incentive Efficiency and Corporate Performance

There exists a unique phenomenon that board chairmen and general manag‐ers are paid equally in some Chinese listed companies .What is the base of the determina‐tion of top management pay equality ?And does top management pay equality have incen‐tive efficiency ? How does top management pay equality affect corporate performance?Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 ,this paper empirically in‐vestigates top management pay equality and its economic consequences .It arrives at the conclusions that top management pay equality in some listed companies mainly arises from the fact that top management pay determinations in some listed companies are dominated by corporate politics or peer effects rather than the efficiency logic alluded by optimal con‐tracting theory .Furthermore ,compared with the counterparts in companies with top man‐agement pay inequality , the board chairmen’ compensation contracts lack efficiency in companies with top management pay equality .As a result ,this kind of equal pay practice is negatively associated with firm accounting performance .In sum , these findings suggest that ,in Chinese context ,more attention should be given to the interfering effects of non-economic factors such as corporate power struggle and internal pay comparison when de‐signing and implementing top management pay contracts .