地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩的影响——基于倾向匹配倍差法的经验分析

地方政府行为如何影响企业产能决策,以往研究主要关注体制因素对产能过剩的影响,而忽略了信息不对称的市场环境的作用.文章结合我国特有的制度环境和信息不对称的市场环境,建立了两期不完全信息的动态博弈模型,探讨地方补贴性竞争对我国产能过剩影响的新机制,研究发现:在信息不对称的市场环境下,地方补贴性竞争导致的产能过剩率长期大于正常产能过剩率;企业所获补贴越多,行业爆发产能过剩的可能性越高.进一步采用PSM-DID模型进行实证检验,发现:相比补贴前,补贴企业补贴后的产能过剩率将会上升1％至3％;相比未补贴企业,补贴企业的产能过剩率高出2％至12％.文章的研究不仅为地方补贴影响产能过剩的微观机制提供了经验证据,而且为政府化解产能过剩提供了启示和参考.

The Effect of Local Subsidy Competition on Excess Capacity in China: Empirical Study Based on Propensity Score Matching-DID

Local governments subsidize enterprises directly or indirectly by various means,which may lead to the over-investment behaviors of enterprises and then induce serious overcapacity problem. How do local government behaviors affect the production and capacity decisions of the enterprises? Previous studies primarily focus on the impacts of institutional factors on overcapacity but ignore the problem of information asymmetry in the market. Moreover,only a few researchers have done the empirical studies on this topic. This paper combines Chinese unique institutional background and asymmetric information environment to build a two-period dynamic game model with incomplete information,so as to explore a new mechanism of the im-pact of local subsidy competition on overcapacity in China. We find that the excess capacity ratio induced by local subsidy competition is larger than the normal excess capacity ratio when the market information is asym-metric. And the more subsidies an enterprise receives,the more likely the industry has overcapacity. Based on the micro-data of enterprises from 2001 to 2007 in China,this paper uses the propensity score matching difference-in-difference method to do the empirical test. The results show that:for those enterprises who have received the subsidies,the overcapacity rate after the subsidies rises by about 1％ to 3％. And compared with those non-subsidized enterprises,the overcapacity rate of subsidized enterprises rises by about 2％ to 12％, which indicates that local subsidies could significantly inhibit the capacity utilization rate of enterprises and exacerbate the overcapacity. This paper provides not only empirical evidence for the impact of local subsidies on overcapacity,but also some policy implications for the governments to deal with overcapacity. Firstly,the interest distribution mechanism between central and local governments should be rationalized,such as improv-ing Chinese financial management system,which could be an institutional method used to regulate the behavi-or of local governments. Secondly,it is necessary to strictly formulate and implement the local subsidy rules and the local administrative accountability system,so as to strictly inhibit the local irregular and excessive sub-sidies. Thirdly,an effective adjustment mechanism for the local subsidies ought to be established to adjust the local subsidy structure actively and exert the overall benefits of local subsidies. The marginal contributions of this paper are as follows: firstly,on the basis of Lin Yifu's "wave phenomenon",this paper pays attention to the subsidy competition of local investments. We construct a dynamic game model with incomplete informa-tion to explore the new mechanism of how local subsidy competition affects the overcapacity. Moreover,we take the lead in using the propensity score matching difference-in-difference method to empirically test the im-pact of local subsidy competition on overcapacity,and focus on the changes in capacity utilization of enter-prises before and after local subsidies. It not only can effectively alleviate the endogenous problem,but also provides some empirical and technical reference for follow-up research.