民间标会持续运行的机制分析

民间标会作为中国非正式金融组织的一种重要形式,长期以来饱受“倒会”事件的困扰。本文在仔细考察民间标会组织运行机制的基础上发现,决定民间标会能否持续运行的,是会头与会脚的博弈过程。在此基础上,本文通过博弈模型的建立与求解,得出倒会均衡点,并在此基础上提出相应政策规制建议。

Analysis on the System of Continually Operating The Civil Bidding

The bidding ROSC As is an important form of informal finance in China,Which have sufferred severely from its occasional collapses.After scrutinizing the running of them,this paper locates that their sustainability depends on the interaction of two kinds of persons.Applying game theory to the foundation and analyzing of a model,the paper narrows down the equilibrium which decides whether the bidding ROSCAs will collapse,and then carries out several relevant recommendations to the government.