Competing auctions with endogenous quantities |
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Authors: | Benny Moldovanu Aner Sela |
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Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Lennestr. 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany b Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel c Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ont., Canada M5S 3G3 |
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Abstract: | Two sellers decide on their discrete supply of a homogenous good. There is a finite number of buyers with unit demand and privately known valuations. In the first model, there is a centralized market place where a uniform auction takes place. In the second, there are two distinct auction sites, each with one seller, and buyers decide where to bid. Using the theory of potential games, we show that in the one-site auction model there is always an equilibrium in pure-strategies. In contrast, if the distribution of buyers values has an increasing failure rate, and if the marginal cost of production is relatively low, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium where both sellers make positive profits in the competing sites model. We also identify conditions under which an equilibrium with a unique active site exists. We deal with the finite and discrete models by using several results about order statistics developed by Richard Barlow and Frank Proschan [R. Barlow, F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, New York, 1965; R. Barlow, F. Proschan, Inequalities for linear combinations of order statistics from restricted families, Ann. Math. Statist. 37 (1966) 1593-1601; R. Barlow, F. Proschan, Statistical Theory of Reliability and Life Testing, McArdle Press, Silver Spring, 1975]. |
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Keywords: | D43 D44 D82 L13 |
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