A characterization of consistent collective choice rules |
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Authors: | Walter Bossert Kotaro Suzumura |
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Affiliation: | a Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, Que., Canada H3C 3J7 b Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603, Japan |
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Abstract: | We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available. |
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Keywords: | D71 |
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