首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


A dynamic model of settlement
Authors:Thorsten Koeppl
Institution:a Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston K7L 3N6, Canada
b European Central Bank, DG Research, D-60311 Frankfurt/Main, Germany
c Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
Abstract:We investigate the role of settlement in a dynamic model of a payment system where the ability of participants to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. In the absence of settlement, the full information first-best allocation cannot be supported due to incentive constraints. In contrast, this allocation can be supported if settlement is introduced, provided that it takes place with a sufficiently high frequency.
Keywords:C72  D82  E40  G20
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号