A dynamic model of unsecured credit |
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Authors: | Daniel Sanches |
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Institution: | Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, United States |
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Abstract: | We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrower?s ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender?s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms. |
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Keywords: | JEL classification: D8 E44 G2 |
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