政府采购制度变迁的双层次互动进化博弈模型

宏观层次和微观层次的博弈具有互动性,政府、财政部门和微观主体的博弈行为可以用这种互动博弈联系起来。正是宏观层次中央政府与各级财政部门、微观层次各级财政部门和微观主体的重复博弈,而使得双层次互动博弈模型为一个动态的模型,从而得到了进化安定策略(ESS),达到进化安定均衡。

The Reciprocal Evolutional Two-level Game Model of Government Procurement Institution Change

Macro and micro levels games of Govern- ment Procurement become reciprocal.The reciprocal games may explain behaviors among central government,all subor- dinate finance departments and micro-subjects.Because of their repeated games,the reciprocal two-level game model shows dynamic,and the evolutional stable balance is ob- tained through their evolutional stable strategies.