网络组织成员合作的声誉模型分析

本文分析了网络组织成员合作稳定的意义与影响因素。在Vickers和Barro分别对Kreps的声誉模型简化处理后的模型基础上，从网络组织成员之间合作的博弈关系角度，构建了成员的声誉模型——一个单边非完全信息动态博弈模型，分析了声誉对网络组织成员的激励效应，以及声誉与网络组织治理绩效之间的关系。本文的基本结论：在有利于经济连续稳定的合作环境中，声誉效应是网络组织成员合作的重要激励机制，在声誉效应的激励机制下，成员之间合作是有效率的。应用本文模型所给出的分析方法与结论，对我国企业网络组织成员存在的机会主义等问题，给出了作者自己的解释，对声誉机制发挥作用的条件提出建议。

Game Analysis of Reputation Mode on Cooperation of Members in Network Organization

First, this paper analyze value and factors on steady cooperation of members in network organization. Then, based on the reputation model of Kreps which was simplified separately by Vickers and Barro in 1986, this paper established a dynamic game model with one-side incomplete information on members of network organization. Employing the model, under the steady economic condition, this paper analyzed the reputation incentive effect to members' cooperation and explained the relation between the reputation and the performance of members' cooperation in the steady economic condition. A result is derived:the reputation is important incentive of members of cooperation. Finally, with the conclusion of model, this paper also addressed some phenomenon in network organization , and give some suggests how to construct environment of reputation incentive effect .