Wage posting without full commitment |
| |
Authors: | Matthew Doyle Jacob Wong |
| |
Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, The University of Waterloo, 219 Hagey Hall of Humanities, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada;2. School of Economics, The University of Adelaide, Levels 3 & 4, 10 Pulteney Street, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia |
| |
Abstract: | Wage posting models of job search typically assume that firms can commit to paying workers exactly the posted wage. We relax this assumption and impose “downward” commitment; firms can commit only to paying at least their advertised wage. As each firm can only commit to pay at least their advertised wage, workers may demand that the firm pay more than the advertised wage. In labor markets with a finite number of workers and firms, the strategic interaction between firms makes it costly for firms to provide applicants the incentive not to demand wages in excess of the advertised wage. In equilibrium, firms may settle for running job auctions at the cost of losing control of the number of applicants that they can attract. When this strategic interaction between firms vanishes, workers never choose to demand more than the advertised wage. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|