从重复博弈看我国保险诚信保障机制的构建

本文基于我国保险诚信缺失的现状,通过构建重复博弈模型分析了我国保险诚信缺失的原因,认为可以通过增大对诚信行为的奖励力度,不诚信行为的惩罚力度,不诚信被发现的概率以及人们对未来有耐心等保障机制使博弈双方回到遵守博弈规则的路径中,以期(诚信,诚信)重复博弈纳什均衡的出现。

Constructing the Security Mechanism for Credibility of Insurance in China from a Repeated Game

This article is based on the loss of credibility of insurance in China and analyses the reasons by constructing a repeated game model.The author thinks that we can make both game sides come back to the path of observing game rules by increasing rewards to credibility behaviors,the punishment to incredibility behaviors,the probability of finding incredibility behaviors and the patience that people treat their future in order to get repeated game Nash equilibrium of(credibility,credibility).