土地入股合作社:交易成本、价值攫取与绩效增长——以吉林省F县双胜村为例

研究目的:分析土地入股合作社从自愿组合到合作瓦解,再到村集体组织主导的合作社的强制性演化的内在机制,揭示合作社价值攫取及绩效增长的规律性问题。研究方法:博弈分析法、个案分析法和归纳总结法。研究结果:(1)合作社公共物品供给不足导致自愿合作瓦解,村集体组织为获得攫取土地价值的机会进而推行合作社的强制性演化;(2)当土地发展性价值尚未凸显时,农户愿意放弃土地发展性价值而获取农业绩效增长;(3)当土地发展性价值超过绩效增长量时,合作社强制性演化将瓦解。研究结论:(1)村集体组织与农户的价值攫取关系,即农户获取的绩效增长能够弥补其放弃的土地发展性价值是强制性演化的前提条件;(2)强制性演化一旦瓦解,村集体组织与农户会围绕土地发展性价值展开争夺,产生高昂的谈判成本,因此,需尽快界定土地剩余产权。

Rural Land Sharing Cooperatives: Transaction Costs,Capture Value and Performance Growth: Take Shuangsheng Village,Jilin Province for Example

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the inner mechanism in the mandatory evolution process from the self-participation to collapse of cooperation, and then to the village collective’s domination mode. It further reveals the regularity of land share-holding corporation in terms of capturing value and performance growth. Methods employed include game theoretical model and case analysis. The results show that the shortage of public goods supply leads to the collapse of the share-holding corporation. The village collective promotes the mandatory evolution to capture land value. When the land development value is not transparent, farmers tend to pursue growth value. If land development value is over performance growth, the mandatory evolution will collapse. Based on the analysis above, we can conclude that the premise condition of mandatory evolution is that farmers can benefit more from performance growth than land development value. If the mandatory evolution fails, there will be an argument between the village collective and farmers, causing high negotiation costs. So it is important to define the property rights on the land value surplus.