On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model |
| |
Authors: | P Mossay PM Picard |
| |
Institution: | aSchool of Economics, University of Reading, Whiteknights Campus, Reading RG6 6AA, United Kingdom;bCREA, University of Luxembourg, 162A rue de la Faiencerie, 1511 Luxembourg, Luxembourg;cCORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34, voie Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium |
| |
Abstract: | Social interactions are at the essence of societies and explain the gathering of individuals in villages, agglomerations, or cities. We study the emergence of multiple agglomerations as resulting from the interplay between spatial interaction externalities and competition in the land market. We show that the geography of the spatial economy affects significantly the properties of spatial equilibria. In particular, when agents locate on an open land strip (line segment), a single city emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the spatial economy extends along a closed land strip (circumference), multiple equilibria with odd numbers of cities arise. Spatial equilibrium configurations involve a high degree of spatial symmetry in terms of city size and location, and can be Pareto-ranked. |
| |
Keywords: | JEL classification: R12 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|