| 内幕交易监管效率与上市公司高管薪酬-一个理论模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘晓峰. 内幕交易监管效率与上市公司高管薪酬-一个理论模型[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2013, 0(1): 265-286 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘晓峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 南开大学经济学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“财富标志转换与宏观经济建模研究”(第二期第一批,2011)资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从公司管理层和外部投资者之间的信息不对称出发,在一般均衡框架下建立同时考虑上市公司高管薪酬、股票价格、内幕交易监管行为的模型。模型表明:如果内部交易者本身是上市公司CEO,除非给予CEO某种形式的额外补偿,否则对于此类型的内幕交易不论怎样加强监管,都不会是有效率的,市场将不存在均衡。我们证明了使市场存在均衡的CEO补偿计划的存在性。对模型的模拟计算表明:内幕交易监管行动与CEO补偿计划的结合,可以提升市场的效率。考虑监管行为的成本后,本文给出最优内幕交易监管行动的数量形式。
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| 关 键 词： | 内幕交易 CEO薪酬 监管 |
The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulations and CEO Compensation |
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| Liu Xiaofeng. The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulations and CEO Compensation[J]. China Economic Quarterly, 2013, 0(1): 265-286 |
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| Authors: | Liu Xiaofeng |
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| Affiliation: | XIAOFENG LIU (Nankai University) |
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| Abstract: | This paper establishes a model to consider CEO compensation, stock price and insider trading regulation from the perspective of general equilibrium. If the inside trader is the CEO himself, there would be no equilibrium in the market and any regulation would not be efficient unless CEO is offered extra compensation. Further simulations show that the combination of insider trading regulation and additional CEO compensation can improve market's efficiency. Taking into account the cost of regulation, optimal i... |
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