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互惠性偏好下的供应链金融委托代理模型比较研究
引用本文:陈畴镛,黄贝拉.互惠性偏好下的供应链金融委托代理模型比较研究[J].商业经济与管理,2015,0(12):52-60.
作者姓名:陈畴镛  黄贝拉
作者单位:1. 杭州电子科技大学
2. 杭州电子科技大学 经济学院
摘    要:供应链金融是近年来兴起的用于解决中小企业融资难问题的重要金融创新之一,但目前学术界的研究多以经典的委托代理模型为基准,忽略了供应链金融参与方之间存在着互惠性偏好的倾向。文章简要回顾了委托代理理论的发展脉络,结合行为经济学家Rabin提出的互惠性偏好理论,对委托代理模型进行了行为经济学层面的拓展,以当前流行的供应链金融中核心企业与协作企业委托代理关系为研究对象,比较分析了互惠性偏好引入前后各方的收益情况。文章首先构建了经典的Holmstorm和Milgrom模型,研究了核心企业和协作企业均为理性经济主体情形下的博弈收益情况;其次,通过将互惠性偏好引入到Holmstorm和Milgrom模型中,比较分析了各方收益的变化情况;再次,通过参数校准的方法,进行了具体的数值案例分析;最后对模型未来可能的发展方向进行了展望。研究结果表明:通过引入互惠性偏好,在一定的数学条件下,核心企业和协作企业之间的契约制度设计存在着帕累托改进的空间。

关 键 词:供应链金融  互惠性偏好理论  委托代理关系  
收稿时间:2015-09-23

A Comparative Analysis of Principal Agent Model of Supply Chain Financing under Reciprocal Preference Theory
CHEN Chouyong HUANG Beila.A Comparative Analysis of Principal Agent Model of Supply Chain Financing under Reciprocal Preference Theory[J].Business Economics and Administration,2015,0(12):52-60.
Authors:CHEN Chouyong HUANG Beila
Abstract:Supply Chain Finance is one of the important financial innovations emerging in recent years, intended to solve the SME’s financing problems. However, so far the academic study often takes the classical principal agent model as a basic model while ignoring the existence of reciprocal preference between financial participants of supply chain. This article briefly reviews development of the principal-agent theory, combines with reciprocal preferences theory proposed by Rabin, expands the level of supply chain finance to level of behavioral economics research. Taking the prevailing principal agent relation between core firms and collaborative firms as the subject, the paper conducts comparative analysis the earnings of different parties after the introduction of reciprocal preference. Firstly, efforts are made to build classic Holmstorm and Milgrom models to study the earnings when the core firm and the cooperative firm are both rational entity; secondly, comparative analysis of changes in earnings of different parties is conducted by introducing the reciprocal preference to Holmstorm and Milgrom models; thirdly, the paper analyzes the data case study in detail by the method of calibration of parameters; at last, it gives possible outlook on development direction of the models in the future. The results show that by introducing reciprocal preference, under certain mathematical conditions, there may exist Pareto improvement space for the contract system design between the core firms and collaborative firms.
Keywords:supply chain financing  reciprocal preference theory  principal-agent relationship  
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