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A passion for voting
Institution:1. Public University of Navarre, Department of Economics, Campus Arrosadia, 31006 Pamplona, Spain;2. University of Vigo, Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Campus Lagoas-Marcosende, 36310 Vigo, Spain;3. University of Granada, Department of Economics, Campus la Cartuja, 18071 Granada, Spain;1. Department of Politics, New York University, NY, Unites States;2. New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE;3. Department of Economics and SFB-884, University of Mannheim, Germany;4. School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australia;5. QuBE, Australia;6. CREMA, Switzerland;1. Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1873 East Mall, FL 9, RM 997, Vancouver, V6T 1Z1, Canada;2. Department of Economics, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive #0508 La Jolla, CA 92093, USA;1. University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Tinbergen Institute, Gustav Mahlerplein 117, 1082 MS Amsterdam, The Netherlands;3. Goethe University Frankfurt, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany;4. CESifo, Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich, Germany
Abstract:We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.
Keywords:Expressive voting  Self-signaling  Ignorant voting  Habitual voting  Bandwagon and underdog effects  Information aggregation in elections  Status quo bias
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