Auctioning divisible goods |
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Authors: | James JD Wang Jaime F Zender |
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Institution: | (1) Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA (e-mail: jwang@mail.duke.edu) , US;(2) Eller College of Business, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA (email: zender@bpa.arizona.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse
bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and
explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply
that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory
auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected
revenue than a discriminatory auction.
Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Divisible good auctions Treasury auctions Equilibrium bidding |
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