Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements |
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Authors: | Fumi Kiyotaki Toshiji Miyakawa |
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Affiliation: | 1. +81‐6‐6721‐2332+81‐6‐6726‐3213;2. Faculty of Economics, Kinki University, , Osaka, 577‐8502 Japan |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex‐ante and ex‐post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior. |
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