首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

反倾销联合应诉博弈分析
引用本文:冯巨章.反倾销联合应诉博弈分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006,23(6):124-133.
作者姓名:冯巨章
作者单位:华南师范大学经济与管理学院
摘    要:在反倾销联合应诉过程中,策略性博弈使得企业个体作出的最优应诉决策偏离了企业整体的最优应诉决策,形成联合应诉的困境,表现出来的就是企业应诉不力、应诉率低。协商是解决联合应诉困境的重要途径,但信息不对称、不确定性和协商成本等因素限制其作用的发挥。而商会等行业组织的良好发展是保障协商顺利进行、走出联合应诉困境和提高应诉力度的关键所在。

关 键 词:反倾销  联合应诉  博弈

Game Analysis on Anti-dumping Joint Pleading
Feng Juzhang.Game Analysis on Anti-dumping Joint Pleading[J].The Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics,2006,23(6):124-133.
Authors:Feng Juzhang
Abstract:When enterprises involved in an anti-dumping case carry out joint pleading, the pleading decision made by enterprises apart deviates from the best pleading decision of enterprise whole because of politic game. It leads to form the dilemma of joint pleading. The performance of the dilemma is mainly inadequate to the cost of pleading and low to the rate of enterprises engaged in pleading. Counsel is an important way to resolve the dilemma of joint pleading. However, the function of counsel is restricted by information asymmetry, uncertainty and consultative cost. The industrial organization such as chamber of commerce developed well is the key to ensure the counsel going on favorably, to get out the dilemma of joint pleading and improve the power of pleading.
Keywords:Anti-dumping  Joint Pleading  Game
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号