| 排污权交易下对企业激励机制的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王蕾,毕巍强. 排污权交易下对企业激励机制的分析[J]. 中国市场, 2009, 0(41): 89-91,94 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王蕾 毕巍强 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 北京工业大学,循环经济研究院,北京,100124
2. 北京工业大学,经济与管理学院,北京,100124 |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市重点学科"资源、环境与循环经济"交叉学科资助;代码033000514203 |
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| 摘 要： | 在法律严明且具有良好执行力的情况下,通过法律对排污权的严格界定并对排污权进行维护,产权能够对排污企业产生良好的激励作用。而在法律不完善或缺乏执行力的情况下,在初始排污权分配和政府的监管环节中,很容易形成排污企业与政府有关部门的共同利益,从而产生寻租行为。要建立和完善排污权交易市场首先要完善相关法律,同时加强第三方监管,加强舆论监督,建立完善的信息公开机制,避免寻租行为的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 排污权交易 激励 寻租 |
Analysis of Incentive Mechanism to the Companies in the Emissions Trading |
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| WANG Lei,BI Wei-qiang. Analysis of Incentive Mechanism to the Companies in the Emissions Trading[J]. China Market, 2009, 0(41): 89-91,94 |
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| Authors: | WANG Lei BI Wei-qiang |
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| Affiliation: | WANG Lei, BI Wei-qiang (1. School of Institute of Recycling Economy, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China) |
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| Abstract: | When the law has strict implementation, by the strict definition of emission rights and the maintenance, property right can produce a good incentive to the companies. On the contrary , in the initial allocation of emission rights and the government＇ s regulatory part, it is easy to form common interests between the companies and the government, and leading to rent-seeking behavior. So if we want to improve the emissions trading market we should first improve related laws, and then strengthen third-party supervision, establish a better information disclosure mechanism to avoid the rent-seeking behavior. |
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| Keywords: | emissions trading incentive rent-seeking |
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