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Price-raising drug enforcement and property crime: a dynamic model
Authors:Jonathan P. Caulkins  Maria Dworak  Gustav Feichtinger  Gernot Tragler
Affiliation:(1) Present address: RAND, 4516 Henry St., Suite 406, 15213 Pittsburgh, PA, USA;(2) Present address: Department of Operations Research and Systems Theory, Vienna University of Technology, Argentinierstrasse 8/1192, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
Abstract:Price-raising drug enforcement suppresses drug use, but it is expensive and may increase property crime. This has led to contradictory recommendations concerning how drug enforcement should or should not be used. We reconcile these recommendations by incorporating the enforcement's effects on both drug use and on property crime within an optimal-control model that recognizes whether convicted drug-involved property offenders are merely incarcerated or whether they receive some form of drug treatment.
Keywords:dynamic programming/optimal control: applications to drug policy  judicial/legal: crime and drug policy
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