Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation |
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Authors: | Mara Olekalns Philip L Smith |
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Institution: | (1) Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester Street, Carlton, VIC, 3953, Australia;(2) Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia |
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Abstract: | Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to
trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased
deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas
those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of
dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur
when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships.
In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled
uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of
a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in
which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease
deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation. |
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Keywords: | deception dyadic negotiation impressions power affect |
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