Britain,EMU and the European economy

In January 1999, 11 member countries of the European Union ‘irrevocably’ locked the foreign exchange values of their currencies to the euro, and they committed themselves to abandon their currencies in favour of the euro in 2002. As a result, these countries ceased to operate independent monetary policies. Monetary policy for the whole euro‐zone became the responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB), whose primary objective is to maintain a low and stable rate of price inflation for the euro currency. The rules governing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were laid down in the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. As conditions for entry to EMU, the treaty specified ‘convergence criteria’ which consisted of upper limits for several macroeconomic aggregates including, notably, a 3 per cent maximum for the ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP and 60 per cent for the ratio of public debt to GDP.1 In February 1998 the 11 applicant countries submitted statistical analyses relating to their satisfaction of these conditions. Despite doubts as to whether some of them had strictly met the conditions, the European Commission deemed them all eligible, and the euro was launched.2 The British government, though more clearly eligible than most other EU countries on the basis of the convergence criteria, decided to defer its decision on entry. In this paper we consider the arguments for and against Economic and Monetary Union, and in particular whether it would be in Britain’s interest to join. We begin with a brief review of the state of the European economy and an analysis of the first year performance of the new Euro currency. 1 Upper limits were also set on the rate of inflation, at 1.5 percentage points above the average inflation rate of the three countries whose inflation was the lowest, and on long term interest rates, at 2 percentage points above the average of the rates prevailing in the three low inflation countries. An additional condition applied to exchange rate stability relative to the EU average for the two years prior to entry.
1 Notable cases were Belgium and Italy with debt to GDP ratios of 122.2 per cent and 121.6 per cent, respectively. Presumably, these countries were allowed membership under Article 104c(2) of the treaty which allows the debt to GDP ratio to be exceeded if ‘. . . the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 60 per cent at a satisfactory pace’. The reader is left to judge whether Belgium and Italy fell within the ‘spirit’ of this article.