A tale of two federalisms: Germany,the United States and the ubiquity of centralization |
| |
Authors: | Thomas Döring Jan Schnellenbach |
| |
Institution: | 1.Carinthia University of Applied Sciences, Research Centre for Interregional Studies and International Management (isma),Villach,Austria;2.Ruprecht-Karls-Universit?t Heidelberg, Alfred Weber Institute for Economics,Heidelberg,Germany |
| |
Abstract: | This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out
the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial
constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against
a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal
institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend
of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal
political institutions. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|