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Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
Authors:Jordi Mass  ,Alejandro Neme
Affiliation:Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spainf1;Instituto de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis, CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina, f2
Abstract:The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.
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