An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries |
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Authors: | Ingo Vogelsang Nishal Ramphal Stephen J Carroll Nicholas M Pace |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA;(2) Pardee RAND Graduate School, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138, USA;(3) RAND Institute of Civil Justice, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138, USA |
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Abstract: | Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings
of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to
see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed
by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their
best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient
under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.
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Keywords: | Class action Insurance regulation Price regulation Legal costs Compensation |
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