In Defense of DEFECT |
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| Authors: | Oscar Volij |
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| Institution: | Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 50011;Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 91905, Israelf1 |
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| Abstract: | The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. |
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| Keywords: | automata complexity prisoner's dilemma |
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