| 国有林区林权制度改革博弈分析及政策建议 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 田昕加,王兆君. 国有林区林权制度改革博弈分析及政策建议[J]. 林业经济, 2009, 0(5) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 田昕加 王兆君 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 东北林业大学经济管理学院;青岛科技大学经济与管理学院; |
| |
| 基金项目： | 黑龙江省科技厅青年基金资助项目(QC08C93) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 利用博弈理论研究了我国国有林区林权制度改革的机理,分析了国有国营体制与国有民营条件下劳动者之间的博弈均衡。发现:在国有国营体制条件下,所有劳动者均不努力工作是一个稳定的均衡,而在国有民营体制条件下,所有劳动者均努力工作是一个稳定的均衡。从博弈论的角度说明了我国国有林区改革的必要性,同时认为国有林区的国有民营体制仍然存在一些不足,对国有林区林权制度进一步改革提出了相应的政策建议。
|
| 关 键 词： | 国有林区 国有国营 国有民营 博弈 |
Game Analysis of State Forest Tenure Reform and Policies |
| |
| Tian Xinjia Wang Zhaojun. Game Analysis of State Forest Tenure Reform and Policies[J]. Forestry Economics, 2009, 0(5) |
| |
| Authors: | Tian Xinjia Wang Zhaojun |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1 College of Economics and Management of Northeast Forestry University;Harbin 150040;2 College of Economics and Management of Qingdao Science and Technology University;Qingdao 266061 |
| |
| Abstract: | The paper studied the state forest tenure reform in China. It analyzed the equilibrium of labors game under the two kinds of system. It found the equilibrium under nationalization is that all laborers do not work. But in the privation, the stable equilibrium is that all laborers work hard. So the game analysis shown that it is necessary to reform China's statel forest. In the privation, the operation of national forest still exist lots of questions. Finally, it proposed some policies to deepen China's fores... |
| |
| Keywords: | state forest nationalization privation game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
