Voting in small networks with cross-pressure |
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Authors: | Ascensión Andina-Díaz Miguel A Meléndez-Jiménez |
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Institution: | (1) Dpto. Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, 29071 Málaga, Spain |
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Abstract: | We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suffer from cross-pressures if voting
against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape
voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how parties may exploit this effect to their interest. We characterize the
strong perfect equilibria of the game and show that, in equilibrium, the social network determines which party wins the election.
We also show that to dispose of the citizens better connected in the network with the other faction is not a guarantee to
win the election.
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Keywords: | Networks Voting Cross-pressures |
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