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Loan sales, implicit contracts, and bank structure
Authors:Joseph G. Haubrich  James B. Thomson
Affiliation:(1) Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, P.O. Box 6387, 44101-1387 Cleveland, OH, USA;(2) Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, P.O. Box 6387, 44101-1387 Cleveland, OH, USA
Abstract:We document some recent changes in the market for loan sales. We then test the main implications of several prevailing theories, using a Tobit model to relate loan sales and purchases to bank size, capital, risk, and funding mode. The results, though not definitive, broadly confirm the Pennacchi funding cost model of sales. Other data cast doubt on the importance of mergers and acquisitions for this market and on the comparability of different data sources.
Keywords:loan sales  banking  securities market
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