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The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms
Authors:Jui-Chin Chang  Alex P. Tang  Victoria Krivogorsky
Affiliation:
  • a Division of International Banking & Finance Studies, School of Business, A.R. Sanchez Jr., Texas A&M International University, 5201 University Boulevard, Laredo, TX 78041, United States
  • b Department of Accounting & Finance, School of Business and Management, Morgan State University, 1700 East Cold Spring Lane, Baltimore, MD 21251, United States
  • c Charles W. Lamden School of Accountancy, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182, United States
  • Abstract:This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.
    Keywords:Options backdating   Corporate governance   SOX   CEO compensation
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