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Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation
Authors:Elettra?Agliardi  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:agliardi@economia.unibo.it"   title="  agliardi@economia.unibo.it"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author,Rainer?Andergassen  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:anderga@economia.unibo.it"   title="  anderga@economia.unibo.it"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126
Abstract:We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12
Keywords:incentives  executive stock options  unhedgeable risks  utility maximisation  non-standard options compensation
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