中央政府和地方政府投资行为博弈分析

笔者通过数据实证分析了20世纪80年代到90年代,中国中央政府与地方政府在基础设施投资行为上发生的变化,并且用博弈模型解释了这种现象产生的原因是政府投资行为适应性的结果,探讨了中央政府如何通过最优基础设施投资补贴率来加强投资调控能力和提高投资调控效率;特别指出了在中央政府支配资金相对不足的情况下,实现基础设施投资最优的方法与途径,并给出相关投资政策措施的理论解释和政策建议.

Game Analysis of the Investment Behavior of the Central Government and Local Governments

With attainable data,the author presents the changes in the behavior of investment in infrastructure of both the central government and local governments of China from 1980 to 1990,and using game models explains that the reason for the changes is the adaptability of the government investment behavior.Furthermore,through theoretical models,this paper analyzes how the central government can strengthen ability and improve investment regulating efficiency.Especially,it points out the ways of achieving optimum infrastructure investment under the condition of deficiency in the administrating capital of the central government.Finally,it gives the theoretical interpretation of related investment policy and measures and proposes some suggestions for making policies.