Corporate boards,large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland |
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| Institution: | 1. Warsaw School of Economics, Department of Comparative Studies, 164 Al. Niepodleglosci, Warsaw 02-554, Poland;2. University of Lodz, 41 Rewolucji 1905 St., Lodz 90-255, Poland;1. Lund University and Centre for Financial Econometrics Deakin University, Australia;2. Centre for Financial Econometrics Deakin University, Australia;1. China''s Management Accounting Research & Development Center & School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, 39 South College Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100081, China;2. University of Edinburgh Business School, Edinburgh, UK;3. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China |
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| Abstract: | The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate. Thus, in concentrated ownership structure managerial power theory prevails over agency theory. However, the effect might be diluted as the number of board members increases. |
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