Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness |
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Authors: | Andrea Attar Eloisa Campioni Gwena?l Piaser Uday Rajan |
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Institution: | 1. Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI), Rome, Italy 2. University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy 3. IPAG Business School, Paris, France 4. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
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Abstract: | We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible. |
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