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Creditor rights and the corporate bond market
Affiliation:1. School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, 39 South College Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China;2. IESEG School of Management, 1 parvis de La Défense, 92044 Paris La Défense Cedex, France;1. Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA;2. NBER, USA;3. BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway;1. Department of Economics Université de Montréal C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville Montréal QC H3C 3J7 Canada;2. Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1818 H St N.W., Washington D.C. 20433, USA;1. Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, Groningen 9700 AV, The Netherlands;2. Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, 1000 East University Ave., Laramie, WY 82071, USA;3. Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA), The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia
Abstract:This study examines whether investor protection affects capital markets, specifically the development of corporate bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 countries, we show that countries with strong creditor rights have more developed corporate bond markets than equity markets. However, we find only weak evidence that countries with stronger shareholder protection have more developed equity markets than corporate bond markets. Additionally, we find that the effect of financial reforms on capital markets is strongly dependent on the strength of investor protection and on the associated information disclosure in a given country.
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