Spatial Cournot competition and economic welfare: a note |
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Authors: | Toshihiro Matsumura Daisuke Shimizu |
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Affiliation: | Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan |
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Abstract: | We investigated welfare implications in location-quantity models in a symmetric linear city. We found that when firms are not agglomerated in equilibrium, increasing the distance between firms raises (reduces) producer surplus and social welfare (consumer surplus). Moreover, central agglomeration is always optimal for consumers among symmetric locations, but not necessarily for producers. Central agglomeration can be inefficient even if it is the unique equilibrium outcome. In short, the firms are more likely to agglomerate or locate closer than what welfare maximizers would dictate, whereas they locate farther apart than what consumer surplus maximizers would recommend. |
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Keywords: | Central agglomeration Spatial Cournot competition Welfare |
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