Childbearing and the distribution of the reservation price of fertility: The case of the Korean baby bonus program

We study the fertility effects of a Korean pro-natalist policy. We show that using the same assumptions and the same binary-choice models used in this literature, and we can estimate the entire unconditional distribution of the reservation price of fertility, which is the minimal compensation an agent must receive to induce her to have a (or an additional) child. Our estimates show that the program’s benefit level and budget would have to be orders of magnitude (about 15 times) larger for the program to bring South Korea back to desired levels of fertility. We also found that over 74% of the program’s expenditures are associated with infra-marginal births – these are births that would have occurred even in the absence of the financial incentive. We show that this is likely not a unique characteristic of the Korean pro-natalist policy but instead a problem of most programs of this nature.