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Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies
Authors:Evan Kwerel  Paroma Sanyal  Katja Seim  Martha Stancill  Patrick Sun
Institution:1.Federal Communications Commission,Washington,USA;2.The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia,USA
Abstract:The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.
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