| 非对称信息条件下最优承包合同的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李平.非对称信息条件下最优承包合同的研究[J].科技进步与对策,2005,22(10):123-125. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李平 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海理工大学,管理学院,上海,200093 |
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| 摘 要： | 承发包双方在合同变更中的机会主义和信息的非对称性，产生了“敲竹杠”和投资过小现象以及隐藏信息的道德风险问题。运用委托-代理理论建立了非对称信息条件下的最优承包合同模型，对上述问题进行了研究。证明在承包商隐藏信息务件下，最优承包合同将使承包商的专用投资水平下降、工程项目工期延长、业主效用降低。
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| 关 键 词： | 隐藏信息 合同变更 承包合同 非对称信息 项目管理 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-7348（2005）10-0123-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-01-14 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-01-14 |
Research on Optimal Contracting Contract under Asymmetric Information |
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| Li Ping.Research on Optimal Contracting Contract under Asymmetric Information[J].Science & Technology Progress and Policy,2005,22(10):123-125. |
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| Authors: | Li Ping |
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| Abstract: | The opportunism and asymmetric of information, gives birth to hold up, low-investment and moral hazard with hidden information between owner and contractor in the contract variation. This paper, using the principal-agent theory, sets up a model of optimal contracting contract under asymmetric information. We show that the optimal investment level is reduced, optimal time of the project is postponed, and utility of the owner is decreased under contractor hidden information. |
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| Keywords: | hidden information contract variation contracting contract asymmetric information project management |
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