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基于Nash谈判的包装容器回收逆物流利益分配模型
引用本文:崔天生,蔺宇于,刘静林.基于Nash谈判的包装容器回收逆物流利益分配模型[J].价值工程,2013(14):31-33.
作者姓名:崔天生  蔺宇于  刘静林
作者单位:1. 一汽-大众销售有限责任公司,长春130011
2. 天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072
摘    要:对于是否采取积极的态度处理包装容器的回收逆物流问题,主机厂和供应商之间存在着博弈,在传统的合作模式下,双方仅从自身的利益出发,进入了囚徒困境,在供应链思想的指导下,双方从供应链有利度的宏观角度出发,可以达到新的纳什均衡,提高博弈双方和供应链整体的收益。通过预算回收成本,确定了供应链思想下博弈有利方让渡利益的大小。从博弈论的角度对包装容器的处理问题进行分析,拓展了包装容器的研究思路,研究结果也为企业如何处理包装容器提供了一定的理论依据。

关 键 词:包装容器  逆物流  博弈论  利益分配

Benefit Distribution Models of Package Containers in Reverse Logistics Based on Nash Models
Abstract:The game exists between suppliers and manufacturers when choosing whether to take a positive attitude to solve the reverse logistics of packing containers.In the traditional cooperation model,supplier and manufacturers only consider their own profit and then get trapped in the prisoner's dilemma.Supplier and manufacturers can achieve new Nash equilibrium from the view of supply chain when they consider the overall benefit of the supply chain,which also increase the benefit of both sides.The paper figures out the size of the benefit for the advantageous party to confer to the other side by considering the cost of recycling package containers.The paper analyzes the reverse logistics of packing containers from the view of game theory,which expands the research mentality of packing containers,and the result of the research also provides theoretical basis for the problem of packing containers.
Keywords:package container  reverse logistics  game theory  benefit distribution
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