Managerial power,perquisite consumption and the efficiency of property right system: Evidence from Chinese listed companies |
| |
Authors: | Rui Lu Minghai Wei Wenjing Li |
| |
Institution: | 1. Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China; 2. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China; 3. Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China |
| |
Abstract: | This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2001–2004 to test the effects of managerial power on perquisite
consumption and firm performance from the perspectives of CEO duality, ownership dispersion and long-term tenure of top executives.
Results show that companies with higher managerial power tend to incur higher perquisite consumption, while their performance
does not improve accordingly. Moreover, perquisite consumption fails to offer effective incentives to managers, and non-state-controlled
listed companies have greater managerial power, higher perquisite consumption, and worse performance than that of their state-controlled
peers. Results also show that managerial power is an important factor influencing compensation incentive. |
| |
Keywords: | managerial power perquisite consumption performance property right |
本文献已被 万方数据 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
| 点击此处可从《Frontiers of Business Research in China》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《Frontiers of Business Research in China》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|