The effect of horizontal mergers,when firms compete in prices and investments |
| |
| Institution: | 1. ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona School of Economics;, Ramon Trias-Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain;2. LUISS Department of Economics and Finance, Viale Romania 24, 00124 Rome, Italy;1. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4, Frankfurt 60323, Germany;2. Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstr. 1, Düsseldorf 40225, Germany;1. Toulouse School of Economics, France;2. Hanken School of Economics and Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Finland;1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology USA;2. Department of Economics and Rotman School of Management University of Toronto Canada;1. Economic Advisory, Deloitte France;2. DIW Berlin, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | Motivated by a number of high-profile antitrust cases, we study mergers when firms offer differentiated products and compete in prices and investments. Since the net effect of the merger is a priori ambiguous, we use aggregative game theory to sign it: we find that absent efficiency gains, the merger always reduces total investments and consumer surplus. We also prove that there exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
