A theory on party discipline and vote switching by legislators |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain;2. Department of Economic Theory and History, Universidad de Má laga, Spain;1. University of Lille, LEM CNRS (UMR 9221), Cité Scientifique, Bâtiment SH2, F 59655, Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France;2. LIEPP Sciences Po Paris, France;3. Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Centre Emile Bernheim de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Gestion, CP-114/03, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 50, 1050. Bruxelles, Belgium |
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Abstract: | We develop a new theory of vote switching by legislators that defect from party line voting. In our model, ideological candidates select their party label and, once elected, vote in parliament. Political parties select their policy platform as to maximize votes while preserving their candidates’ loyalty. We find that legislators that defect from party line voting arise within the majority party. Besides, the more legislators care about their ideology and the less about their own reputation, the more they defect from party line voting. Interestingly, when a party has larger electoral advantage and its candidates sufficiently care about their reputation, such a party can propose a more polarized policy to avoid party defectors. Our model suggests that polarization incentivizes loyalty. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our results in multi-party systems and multi-constituency systems. |
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Keywords: | Switching Party discipline Ideology Reputation Ambition Polarization D7 D72 D78 |
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