The price of silence: Media competition,capture, and electoral accountability |
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| Institution: | 1. DISEIS, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy;2. DISEIS and CSCC, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy;1. Department of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, USA;2. FAME|GRAPE, ul. Mazowiecka 11/14, 00-052, Warsaw, Poland;1. University of Valencia, ERI-CES, Spain;2. Faculty of Economics, Avda. dels Tarongers, s/n, 46022, Valencia, Spain;1. Sao Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Brazil;2. Center for Engineering, Modeling and Applied Social Sciences (CECS) and PPGE, Federal University at ABC (UFABC), Brazil;3. Treasury Specialist at BRF, Brazil;1. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, India;2. Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy (CSSSC), Calcutta, India;3. CES–ifo, Munich, Germany;4. GEP, Nottingham, UK;5. National Law University, Delhi, India;6. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India;1. Ifo Institute, Germany;2. LMU Munich, Germany;3. CESifo, Munich, Germany;4. Bar-Ilan University, Israel;5. Ariel University, Israel |
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| Abstract: | Is competition in the mass media market an effective deterrent against media capture? Does it prevent political groups from influencing reporting? This paper shows that in some cases it does not. Building on the literature on media capture, the model highlights that, under fairly generic assumptions, high competition in the media market can drive the cost of media capture to zero, making capture easier. Moreover, it highlights conditions on the parameters where the effect of competition on capture is non-monotonic, i.e. capture may occur for levels of competition lower, but also higher, than those leading to media freedom. |
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| Keywords: | Political agency Mass media Competition Media capture D72 D73 D78 L82 |
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