Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Middlesex University London, UK;2. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Germany;1. RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Ruhr Graduate School in Economics, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128, Essen, Germany;2. Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759, Bremen, Germany;3. RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Jacobs University Bremen, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128, Essen, Germany;1. University of Lodz, Poland;2. University Paris Nanterre, France;1. University of Passau, CESifo, Germany;2. CESifo, Munich, Germany;3. GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies (Associate Researcher), Germany;1. Economics Department, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt;2. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, USA;3. African Tax Institute, University of Pretoria, South Africa;4. Economics Department and ExCEN, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, USA;5. Political Science Department, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt |
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| Abstract: | We analyze a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique cost-continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups. |
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| Keywords: | Costly voting Redistribution Pivotal voter model |
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