Competition in the acquisition market and returns to bidders in Australia |
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Affiliation: | (School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland), Australia |
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Abstract: | This study investigates the impact of takeover market competition on the short-run market performance of Australian acquirers. While the market for corporate control predicts a positive association between takeover market competition and acquirers’ announcement period returns, the winner’s curse hypothesis predicts a negative relationship. Using six alternative proxies to capture acquisitions market competition, I find that takeover market competition has a significant negative influence on acquirers’ announcement period returns. However, this effect is more pronounced among private target acquirers, large acquirers and stock-financed acquisitions. The findings further reveal that large bidders acquiring private targets through stock-financed acquisitions are the most penalised group in the capital market in a competitive acquisitions market. Additionally, evidence is found which suggests that competition-induced bids are associated with significantly higher bid premiums and experience negative post-acquisition performance. The findings remain robust to the implementation of alterations to several methodological concerns, the issue of endogeneity and sample selection variations. |
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Keywords: | Acquisitions Takeover market competition Private target acquirers, public target acquirers Cumulative abnormal return Size effect |
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